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Abstract
The current economic crisis has had a damaging effect on businesses. Many directors 
and sole traders have found their debts accumulate to an unmanageable level as a 
result. Considering the large amounts of money in question these cases will ultimately 
lead to personal bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act 1988. However, this legislation 
was enacted in a time when very little credit was extended to individuals. Many 
commentators believe there is a need to reform this legislation. It is criticised for 
being outdated and irrelevant in this credit society. 
This thesis explores current bankruptcy legislation in order to find out why there is a 
need for reform. It discusses the issues surrounding the current legislation, which is 
largely unused by over indebted individuals. Furthermore, it discovers whether the 
legislation proposed by the Law Reform Commission provides the solution to these 
current issues and if not, what provisions would be suitable. As the proposed 
legislation is more lenient on the debtor, this thesis will also explore whether this will 
create any issues. 
The results, based on interviews with eight insolvency practitioners, reveal there is 
indeed an urgent need to reform this legislation. It is punitive, unfair and restricts 
bankrupts from re-entering the business community and contributing to the economy. 
At a time when entrepreneurship is vital in Ireland’s road to recovery, this is a 
fundamental flaw with the BA 1988. The findings also found that the interviewees 
believe the proposed law is suitable for the most part but, at times unrealistic and in 
need of some minor adjustments. The proposed Bill is not expected to be published 
until 2012 and when this will be enacted is uncertain.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The ongoing recession has highlighted serious and fundamental flaws in the Irish 
business and banking sectors regarding the ways in which business in Ireland is 
financed. The easing of restrictions to credit, created an environment where 
businesses were actively encouraged to amass significant amounts of debt, which if 
economic commentators such as McWilliams (2010) are to be believed, will 
ultimately have to be resolved through the bankruptcy courts. The recession has had a 
detrimental effect on businesses as they do not have the same access to credit they 
once enjoyed, leaving them unable to pay their debts. As a result of this, there were 
2,900 insolvencies in 2009 and 2010 (Finfacts 2011). Throughout the course of 
liquidation, limited liability protects directors from personal exposure to the debts of 
the company but in some instances this is not the case. Directors may become 
personally liable for the debts of the company if they have breached the companies act 
or have signed personal guarantees. Furthermore, as a sole trader is not protected by 
limited liability he will be personally liable for the debts of the business. Considering 
the large monetary values involved, it is likely that many such cases will result in 
bankruptcy. 
 
Bankruptcy is a commonly used yet misunderstood term. The term bankruptcy is 
generally used to describe any individual who is unable to pay their debts but this is 
not the case. To be “bankrupt” an individual must be declared so by the High Court 
and go through bankruptcy procedures set out in the Bankruptcy Act (BA) 1988. This 
law is twenty three years old and it was enacted pre Celtic tiger when there was very 
little credit extended to people and very few owned a credit card. Now in these 
recessionary times, when people are struggling to keep up with debt repayments, it 
has become an urgent issue. The Law Reform Commission (LRC) 2010 have made 
proposals to update this legislation and many including Baxter (2011), Holohan 
(2010), Fine Gael (2010), Joyce (2003, 2009) and Stafford (2006) have written 
articles surrounding this issue.  
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This thesis will explore the issues with current Irish bankruptcy legislation in order to 
find if there is a need for reform. The BA 1988 has been accused of having an adverse 
effect on entrepreneurship for a number of reasons including restricting bankrupts 
from re-entering the business community sometimes for the rest of their lives. Taking 
into account the important contribution businesses make to our economy these issues 
will be given particular consideration. Furthermore, this thesis will explore whether 
the legislation proposed by the LRC provides the solution to these issues and if not, 
what would be more suitable alternatives.  
 
In order to explore Irish bankruptcy legislation, emphasis will be placed on those who 
have become bankrupt due to business debt. Cases involving directors and sole traders 
have a greater degree of complexity attached considering the large amounts of money 
that could be in question, in comparison to individual with personal debt. If the LRC’s 
recommendations are implemented there will be a non judicial system in place to deal 
with those who have consumer debt, excluding them from bankruptcy legislation. 
However, it can be expected that complex cases involving business debt will be dealt 
with in court under bankruptcy legislation. For this reason, directors and sole traders 
will be focused on in order to explore bankruptcy legislation in this country. For ease 
of reference, this thesis will refer to the bankrupt as a male considering this reflects 
the reality here in Ireland where 93% of active bankrupts are males (Holohan and 
Sanfey 2010).   
  
1.2 Research questions 
This thesis aims to answer the following questions:  
 
1. What is the relevant legislation regarding cases where directors or sole traders 
become bankrupt as a result of their business debts? 
2. Why is there a need for reform of the BA 1988? 
3. Is the legislation proposed by the LRC appropriate and if not, what would be 
more suitable alternatives? 
4. Are there any drawbacks associated with the proposed legislation? 
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In order to answer these research questions, the remainder of this thesis is structured 
as follows: chapter two sets out the similarities and differences between insolvency, 
liquidation and bankruptcy. These terms are core to this topic and for this reason it is 
important to clarify what they mean. In addition, chapter two will also provide a 
background to the legal framework that is applicable to the bankruptcy of directors 
and sole traders. It will outline the instances when a company director may face 
personal bankruptcy under the Companies Act (CA) 1963 and also the Companies 
Amendments Act [C(A)] 1990. In addition to this, the BA 1988 will be outlined. 
Finally, chapter two will identify the arguments in favour of reform. These arguments 
are based on the current issues with bankruptcy legislation in Ireland. How the 
proposed legislation intends to deal with these issues will also be discussed 
throughout this section.  
 
Chapter three outlines the methodology which was applied for conducting the primary 
research. Semi structured interviews were chosen and in this chapter the reasons and 
justifications for this method have been described. In addition, an explanation for each 
question asked is given in order to clearly link these questions to the research 
objectives. Finally, a brief over view of the procedures used to analysis the data will 
be described. 
 
Chapter four will present the findings from the semi structured interviews with eight 
insolvency practitioners. Furthermore, it will provide an interpretation of this 
information in order to answer the research questions outlined above. 
 
Chapter five discusses both the findings of the secondary and primary research in 
order to link these results back to the research questions.  
 
Finally, chapter six will provide an overall conclusion to this thesis. Additionally, 
areas for further research will be identified.  
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1.3 Contributions of this study 
This study will first and foremost be of benefit to the business studies students at 
Letterkenny Institute of Technology. It will provide an insight into Irish bankruptcy 
legislation, a topic which is not explored on any syllabus at this institute. It may also 
inspire students to choose this as the topic for their thesis in the future when further 
developments have taken place regarding the reform. It may also provide such 
students with an insight into the issues which existed pre reform in order to draw 
comparisons. This study may also benefit those who find themselves unable to pay 
their debts by helping them to understand more about the process. Finally, this study 
may be of some interest to any individual who is considering a career in this area.        
 
1.4 Limitations of this study 
The intention of this study is to provide an insight into the complex topic of 
bankruptcy by highlighting the issues with the current legislation and also discussing 
the proposals made by the LRC in relation to the reform. This is a small scale research 
project which conducted eight interviews and therefore the findings and results are not 
conclusive.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the literature which exists regarding the reform of the BA 1988. 
The differences and similarities between the terms insolvency, liquidation and 
bankruptcy will be explained in order to clarify exactly what they mean. This will be 
followed by a brief description of the relevant legal framework which surrounds this 
topic. There will be a review of the published issues with the current legislation and 
also the proposals made by the LRC in relation to a reform. Finally, the consequences 
of introducing more lenient legislation will be outlined. 
 
2.2 Insolvency, Liquidation and Bankruptcy  
There are common misconceptions regarding the meaning of these three terms so it is 
important to clarify and differentiate between them. Insolvency occurs when a 
company or an individual cannot pay their debts as they fall due. In other words their 
liabilities outweigh their assets. Personal insolvency is not defined in law rather the 
BA 1988 defines acts of bankruptcy. S.214 of the CA 1963 states a company is 
insolvent if it is unable to pay a debt exceeding £50, owing for three weeks or if the 
debts of the company outweigh its assets. When a business becomes insolvent the 
owner is personally responsible for the business debts. When a company is insolvent 
it can be put into liquidation, meaning the company will be wound up and closed 
down. Liquidation can be likened to bankruptcy but applies only to companies. The 
main purpose of liquidation is to realise all of the assets of the company and in 
accordance with S.285 of the CA 1963, distribute the proceeds amongst the creditors 
in order of priority, paying out any remaining surplus to the members. S.225 of the 
CA 1963, states a liquidator is appointed for the purpose of conducting the 
proceedings in winding up a company. Liquidation may result in personal bankruptcy 
for the company directors. 
 
Bankruptcy law applies only to individuals. This legislation was designed to deal with 
both debtors who are unwilling to pay, these are referred to as the “cant pays” and 
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those who are unable to pay, referred to as the “wont pays”. The standard definition of 
bankruptcy is considered to be a quote from an English case in 1874 
“Bankruptcy is a law for the benefit and the relief of creditors and their 
debtors, in cases in which the latter are unable or unwilling to pay their 
debts” (Reiman Fed Cas 1874) 
Bankruptcy is a generic term, which covers a wide range of over indebted individuals 
including company directors and sole traders who may find themselves responsible 
for the debts of their business regardless of whether the company is incorporated or 
not. The reason why personal bankruptcy law applies to businesses, and not just to 
individuals, is because when a firm is not limited by liability, its debts are personal 
liabilities of the firm’s owner, the sole trader. A sole trader can become a director by 
incorporating their firm into a company. When a firm is incorporated limited liability 
applies, therefore the directors are not legally responsible for the firm’s debts.  
However limited liability will not always apply to directors who have breached 
company law or signed personal guarantees leaving them personally liable for the 
companies’ debts. 
 
2.3 Directors and Bankruptcy 
There is a perception that limited liability will apply to all directors of companies but 
this is not always the case. As mentioned previously limited liability will not always 
protect the directors. They may invest all their savings in the company or take out 
personal loans in an attempt to try and save the company. Furthermore, if a personal 
guarantee has been signed or if they have breached the company’s acts by repaying a 
debt as a fraudulent preference, trading recklessly or fraudulently or failing to 
maintain proper books of account.  
 
Personal debt and savings 
When a business is failing the directors may invest all their saving and also take out 
personal loans in order to try to rescue the company. If insolvency and closure occur 
regardless, this means that along with being personally responsible for the personal 
loans, they will also have lost their regular income from the company and may face 
bankruptcy as a result. 
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This situation was seen in the case of the construction company P Elliot. The key 
directors had personal loans for tens of millions of Euros with the Bank of Scotland as 
a result of trying to save their company, which went into receivership in May of this 
year Now these directors may be facing bankruptcy as it is unlikely they will be able 
to repay this debt. (Daly 2011). 
 
Personal Guarantee  
A personal guarantee is a guarantee from an individual in relation to a business loan. 
If the business is unable to repay, the onus is on the individual to take on the debt. 
Directors may have signed these guarantees in order to secure finance for the business 
when the assets of the company were inadequate. Personal guarantees had become a 
common business practice during the boom years. This was very much so the case in 
the construction industry where suppliers such as “chadwicks” had personal guarantee 
clauses written into all of their contracts. In addition to this, if a company had leases 
of any sort these contracts always included some form of personal guarantee (Leydon 
2011). Now in the recession, these guarantees have become a real issue. Mc Donagh 
(2011), the CEO of Nama, stated that every developer involved in the first transfer of 
assets to Nama had been involved in a personal guarantee. In total approximately 60% 
of their loans had a personal guarantee attached.    
 
This situation is best illustrated in the cases of Sean Quinn and Bernard McNamera. 
Anglo Irish Bank is pursuing Sean Quinn and members of his family for €2.8b worth 
of loans for which they provided personal guarantees (Curran 2011). As a result of 
this, a Swedish court has approved the appointment of a bankruptcy receiver to the 
Quinn’s companies (Noonan 2011).  Similarly, Bernard McNamara provided many 
personal guarantees which have been estimated at €300m (McCaughren 2011). There 
has been a petition issued against McNamara in order to declare him bankrupt 
(Hartnett 2010).  
 
Given the economic crisis and especially the collapse of the construction sector, it is 
widely recognised by leading economist Kelly (2010) and Broderick (2011) that there 
are many others in a similar position. These individuals do not have the assets to 
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cover these personal guarantees and this will ultimately lead to bankruptcy (Maguire 
2011). 
 
Companies Act 1963-2009  
S.297 of the CA 1963 introduced the concept of making a director personally liable 
for the debts of their company.  The liquidator is required to examine the actions of 
directors throughout the liquidation. The legislature has created a number of charges 
or actions which can be brought against the directors who have abused their position 
within the company (McConville 2008).  
 
Fraudulent preference   
S.218 of the CA 1963 states, when the winding up of a company commences, any sale 
of company property or preferential payment is void, unless the court directs 
otherwise. If a preferential payment is made to a creditor who holds a personal 
guarantee from a director this is called fraudulent preference. Under S.286 of the CA 
1963, the director can be held personally liable for the debt as the payment will be 
held as void by the court. This can also be seen as fraudulent or reckless trading as the 
director has continued to trade after the commencement of the winding up 
(McConville 2008). 
 
Fraudulent or reckless trading 
Under S.56 of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001, the liquidator of an 
insolvent company must send a S.56 report to the Director of Corporate Enforcement. 
In this report the liquidator must comment on the behavior of the directors and give an 
opinion as to whether or not they acted honestly and responsibly in relation to their 
business affairs (Taite 2008). Under S.297 of the CA 1963, if the directors are found 
to have acted fraudulently or recklessly in the carrying on of the company business, 
this will impose personal liability for the debts of the company on the directors (Mc 
Conville 2008).  
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Reckless in relation to the directors knowledge, experience and skill that may 
reasonable be expected of a person in their position, that they should have known 
their actions or those of the company would cause loss to a creditor, or if they 
contracted a debt and they did not honestly believe the company would be able to 
repay it (Mc Conville 2008). An example of this could be if a company is in financial 
difficulties and continues to trade unless they have a reasonable expectation that they 
can afford to do so.  S.297 of the CA 1963 states fraudulent trading is found to occur 
where it appears that the business of the company has been carried on with the 
intention to defraud creditors or any other person.  
 
Failure to Maintain Proper Accounts 
Under S.204 of the C(A)A 1990, if there has been a failure to keep proper books of 
account, the court may hold the directors personally liable for the company's debts if 
it considers that such failure: has contributed to the company's inability to pay its 
debts, or has resulted in uncertainty as to the assets and liabilities of the company, or 
has obstructed the timely winding-up of the company (Callanan 2007).  
 
These sections of the Companies Acts were largely unused throughout the boom years 
as many companies in financial difficulties were able to obtain easy access to credit in 
order to remain in business. Now in the current economic climate business failure has 
increased and as a result so has investigations by liquidators. Naturally, this has led to 
an increase in the amount of directors who are expected to be found guilty of the 
above offences. Under S.150 of the CA 1963, directors who have been found guilty of 
the above crimes can be restricted, for a period of up to fifteen years from re-entering 
the business community or in more serious cases, be disqualified. For example, David 
Drumm, the former Anglo Irish Bank chief executive is wanted by the Director of 
Corporate Enforcement, the Gardai and the Chartered Accountants Regulatory Board 
for questioning about his alleged fraudulent activities at the bank (Phelan 2011, Ryan 
2011 and Carswell 2011). Furthermore, investigations are on going into his colleague 
Sean Fitzpatrick’s, activities (Keane 2011) who was declared bankrupt last year 
(Carolan 2010). The current Irish bankruptcy system would impose severe penalties 
on such individuals regardless of whether they are found to have become bankrupt 
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through no fault of their own or fraudulently. This will be explored in more detail 
below. 
 
2.4 Personal Bankruptcy Legislation- Bankruptcy Act 1988 
To be adjudicated bankrupt the debtor must owe at least €1900 and have committed 
an act of bankruptcy. A creditor can force their debtor into bankruptcy however, the 
debtor may also decide to become bankrupt voluntarily. In 2009, 2 of the 17 
bankruptcies were voluntary (Holohan and Sanfey 2010). Once a debtor is adjudicated 
bankrupt, he is required to hand over all his assets and property, including the family 
home, to the Official Assignee. He will be allowed to retain such articles of clothing, 
furniture, household and tools of trade to the value of €2,500 (O’Grady 2011).  There 
are many restrictions which apply to a bankrupt up until such a time as they are 
discharged.  
Official Assignee- Christopher Lehane 
Once an individual is adjudicated bankrupt all their property must vest in the Official 
Assignee. Under S.61 of the BA 1988, the role of the official assignee is to realise the 
bankrupt’s assets and distribute them among the creditors in order of preference. The 
family home must also vest in the Official Assignee even if it is co-owned. In 
addition, any property which is acquired by the bankrupt post adjudication must also 
vest in the Official Assignee (Holohan and Sanfey 2010). 
Acts of Bankruptcy 
These are defined in S.7 (1) of the BA 1988. There are nine acts of bankruptcy, the 
most commonly seen are: 
S.7(1) (f) which provides that a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy when a 
court order has been issued against the debtor in respect of an unpaid debt and the 
sheriff has been unable to seize goods sufficient to adequately cover the debt and; 
“if execution against him has been levied by the seizure of his goods 
under an order of any court or if a return of no goods has been made by 
the sheriff or county registrar whether by endorsement on the order or 
otherwise”  
 13
S.7 (1) (g) which provides that when a bankruptcy summons remains unpaid after 14 
days the debtor will have committed an act of bankruptcy  
“if the creditor presenting a petition has served upon the debtor in the 
prescribed manner a bankruptcy summons, and he does not within 
fourteen days after service of the summons pay the sum referred to in the 
summons or secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor” 
After the debtor has been adjudicated bankrupt the creditors are required to lodge 
their claims for unpaid debts with the Official Assignee. These claims will then be 
categorised. 
Categories of Debt 
There are two types of debt. Preferential debts include rates, taxes and amounts due to 
employees. These are all set out in S.81. Non preferential debts are all other claims 
including loans of any type (EC 2005). 
Restrictions 
Under S.129 of the BA 1988 a bankrupt is not entitled to apply for credit over €650 
without informing the lender of their status. Under S.183 of the CA 1963 a bankrupt 
is prohibited from acting as a company director or from being in any way concerned 
with the management of a company. Furthermore, a bankrupt cannot practice as a 
solicitor (S.50 of the solicitors act 1954), be elected a member of parliament (S.51 of 
the Electoral Act 1923) or may not leave the jurisdiction without the leave of the court 
(S.124 of BA 1988). S. 72 of the BA 1988 states the court can order for the bankrupts 
post to be re-directed to the Official Assignee. Once a bankrupt is discharged all 
restrictions no longer apply. The EC (2005) suggest that a discharged bankrupt will 
have difficulty getting credit.  
Discharge 
Under S.85, the bankrupt will remain so until they are discharged. There is no 
automatic discharge period in Irish bankruptcy legislation. An undischarged bankrupt 
will remain so even after death (Maguire 2011). If the debtor repays all their debts or 
all their preferential debts and 50% of their non-preferential they can apply to the 
High Court to be discharged. If they have failed to do this and have remained 
bankrupt for a period of twelve years or more they may also apply to be discharged. 
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This twelve year period is referred to as conditional discharge. This is the longest 
period of any EU country, where the average is five years (Keily 2009). Considering 
the cost of the High Court many do not return to the court to be discharged. As a 
result, bankruptcies have lasted up to twenty five years or even for the remainder of 
the debtor’s life (Laffoy J in Grace vs. Ireland and the Attorney General 2007). 
 
2.5 Issues with Irish bankruptcy legislation 
The bankruptcy legislation is rarely used by over indebted individuals. In 2009, 17 
were declared bankrupt, this figure increasing to 29 in 2010 (Collins 2011) and to date 
in 2011, 16 individuals have been declared bankrupt (Examiners Office 2011). The 
possible reasons for these low figures will now be explored. 
The core argument of this paper is that there is a need to reform the BA 1988. Baxter 
(2011) and Joyce, senior policy researcher with the Free Legal Aid Centre’s (Kennedy 
2008), states all parties concerned are convinced of the need for reform. Reifner et al. 
(2003) stated that Irish bankruptcy legislation should not even be called an insolvency 
procedure due to the fact it is rarely used and is very expensive.  The EC in its second 
chance paper (2007) scored all European countries bankruptcy systems based on their 
treatment of bankrupts, Austria came out on top with 7 points, and the UK received 5. 
Meanwhile Ireland received 2 but this was wrongly based on the assumption that after 
12years there is an automatic discharge (Holohan and Sanfey 2010).  
 
Leading commentators on bankruptcy such as O’Neill (2011), Brown (2011), Richard 
Clarke (2011) and Holohan (2011) have highlighted issues with current bankruptcy 
legislation such as the discouragement of entrepreneurship by imposing a lengthy 
discharge period, the payment of preferential debts before discharge, high legal costs 
and not distinguishing between culpable and non culpable debtors. If these issues are 
dealt with by making this law more debtor friendly, it could have a lasting impact on 
the economy as it may encourage abuse of the system and it may also increase the 
cost of debt. It is important the correct balance is found, on one hand too strict 
bankruptcy laws could deter individuals from using bankruptcy as soon as they are in 
financial difficulties when they are merely delaying the inevitable. On the other hand, 
lenient laws could mean the writing off of millions of euro’s worth of debt, as a result 
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of fresh start policy bankruptcy legislation which allows bankrupts to start a fresh 
with a clean slate. Many accounting and insolvency professionals in Ireland have 
published their positions on the need for a reform of the BA 1988. Baxter (2010) 
discusses the urgent need for reform in this country. He asks 
“Why were over 74,000 individuals in England and Wales declared bankrupt last 
year, yet in Ireland the equivalent was only 17?”  (Baxter 2010: 7) 
 
However, the numbers of registered judgements against debtors who have not repaid 
their debts have increased. In 2009 there were 5,557 judgements to the value of 
€376.4m, this increased to 7,447 judgements valued at €1.18b in 2010 (Mulligan 
2011). The Law Reform Commission LRC (2009) compared this low figure of 17 
Irish bankrupts in 2009 with Northern Ireland reporting that there were 1237 
bankrupts in the same period. The LRC (2010) indicate that the current system serves 
little purpose and does not provide any benefit to Irish society. According to Djankov 
et al. (2008) the main test of whether bankruptcy law is effective in achieving its 
objectives is the amount of individuals who use the procedure.  
 
2.5.1 Discouragement of Entrepreneurship 
Peng et al (2009) states that when entrepreneurs know that they will not be given a 
second chance if their company becomes insolvent, this acts as a deterrent to them 
starting a new business in the first place. White (2010) agrees stating that debtor 
friendly bankruptcy legislation makes self-employment more attractive to risk averse 
individuals. This can be justified by research conducted by Cumming and Armour 
(2008) which found that, bankruptcy laws are the most important contributor to high 
levels of self-employment and the possibility of households owning businesses is 35% 
higher if they live where there is debtor friendly laws (Berkowitz and White 2004). 
Gallop (2009) states that 49% of individuals would not start up a business for fear of 
the consequences of bankruptcy. 
 
In order to combat this, the European Commission EC (2011) in their second chance 
report, encouraged member states to adapt fresh start approaches to bankruptcy 
legislation by reducing the stigma attached and as a result creating a more supportive 
environment for businesses at risk and a more favourable climate towards 
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entrepreneurship. They have taken the stance that business closure and bankruptcy are 
something which is natural and that bankruptcy should be treated as a rehabilitation 
process in order to allow the entrepreneur to re enter the business world. Instead of 
this, current bankruptcy legislation in Ireland is based on a “philosophy of 
punishment” (LRC 2009:164) and is considered to be “anti entrepreneurial” (ISME 
Fielding 2011: 7 and Daly 2010a: 1).  
 
Encouraging entrepreneurship through bankruptcy law reform has been the subject of 
work undertaken by the LRC (2010). In order to achieve this they have recommended 
more debtor friendly legislation. Firstly they propose the introduction of an automatic 
discharge. They also recommend the abolishment of the stipulation that all 
preferential debts must be paid before the bankrupt is discharged. Furthermore, they 
propose that culpable and non culpable bankrupts be distinguished between in order to 
ensure honest bankrupts are released back into the business community and culpable 
bankrupts are restricted from doing so.  The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development OECD (2003), Second Chance Report (2011), Kok (2004), Ekanem 
and Wyer (2007), Dybvad (2011), Schror (2006) and Stam et al. (2006) find that 
those who have been declared bankrupt have learned from their mistakes and are 
generally more successful second time round. Examples of such bankrupts include 
Walt Disney, Henry Ford, H.J Heinz (Holohan 2011), Alan Sugar and Simon Cowell 
(Daly 2009). In addition to this, failure allows society to learn which entrepreneurial 
endeavours do not provide economic growth (Hoetker and Agarwal 2007, Second 
Chance Report 2011, Knott and Posen 2005, McGrath 1999, Lee et al. 2007, and 
Peng et al. 2010).  
Length of Discharge Period 
The Irish discharge period is based on recommendations made by the Budd 
Committee in 1972, a group set up in 1962 to put forward proposals for the now BA 
1988. They stated that bankrupts should not be discharged for as long as possible “as 
most bankruptcies are brought about by either gross negligence, incompetence, sharp 
practice or petty fraud” (Budd Report 1972: 170). However, evidence drawn from the 
second chance report (2011) states bankruptcies which involve fraud are as low as 3-
6% and so this assumption could be called into question. The Civil Miscellaneous 
Provision Bill (2010) included an automatic discharge period of twenty years. The 
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Civil Miscellaneous Bill (2011) goes further and shortens the automatic discharge 
period to twelve years while introduces a conditional discharge period of five years. 
This would effectively mean that three hundred bankrupts would be discharged 
(Coulter 2011). Fielding, president of the Irish Small and Medium Enterprise 
Organisation, Mc Evoy, president of the Institute of Certified Accountants, Talbot, 
chief executive of Chambers Ireland and Blackwell, director general of the Free Legal 
Aid Centres all welcome the introduction of an automatic discharge period yet they 
agree it is still too long (O’Halloran 2011). O’Grady (2011) agrees describing this as 
merely an interim measure and of little practical impact, especially as this discharge 
period is still considerably longer than in other jurisdictions.  To date neither bill has 
been brought into law. The LRC (2010) and the International Association of 
Restructuring, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Professionals INSOL (2001) recommend 
that distinguishing between culpable and non culpable debtors would still protect the 
business community with strict sanctions for those who have acted wrongfully.  
 
The LRC (2010) recommends an automatic discharge period of three years. This will 
allow honest bankrupts back into the business community sooner, increasing 
entrepreneurial activity (Lee et al 2010).   
 
No distinction between culpable and non-culpable bankrupts 
Under the BA 1988 all the restrictions detailed above relate to both culpable and non-
culpable bankrupts. This exhibits the laws policy of viewing bankrupts as 
untrustworthy, dishonest and/ or incapable. The second chance report (2011) states 
that only fraudulent and criminal behaviour such as breaches of the Companies Acts, 
should be punished.  The reality of bankruptcy and business failure is a normal part of 
economic life but public opinion does continue to make a strong connection between 
business failure and fraud (LRC 2010). This lack of a distinction is now being 
challenged by a team of lawyers as they see it as a constitutional flaw in the current 
system. They believe that the courts should be given discretion when penalising the 
bankrupt based on their particular case (Kennedy 2011).    
 
Additionally, the LRC (2010) have recommended that a procedure be put in place 
where dishonest bankrupts are restricted from going back into business. In addition to 
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this, criminal and civil offences will be put in place against dishonest bankrupts. 
However, prosecutions against white collar crime in Ireland have been described as 
“pathetic” (Webb and McBride 2011: 5) and so this punishment could be called into 
question. Finally, they proposed that the bankrupt may be required to pay towards 
their debts after discharge for a period of five years. It is important that if this system 
is implemented, it is adequately monitored as the payment of debts after discharge has 
been ineffective in the US according to White (2010). She finds that bankrupts are 
likely to work less after being discharged from bankruptcy if their earnings are subject 
to the repayment of debt. 
 
Honest bankrupts would not be subjected to these punishments and restrictions. This 
means that honest bankrupts will be allowed back into the business community after 
discharge. This will have the effect of encouraging entrepreneurship as those 
bankrupts who acted honestly will be allowed back into the business community in 
order to contribute to the economy.  
 
Preferential Debts as a condition for discharge 
Under the BA 1988, bankrupts must pay all preferential debts before they can be 
discharged.  This condition is almost never met (LRC 2010). The LRC (2010) 
recommends that S.85 (4) of the BA1988 be abolished. This section states that all 
expenses, fees, costs and preferential payments must be paid before the debtor is 
discharged. They have also recommended that revenue debts should be no longer 
given preferential status. Tax debts associated with business failure could be vast 
depending on the size of the firm. In the US, tax debts must be paid before the debtor 
can be discharged from bankruptcy.  This is to prevent bankruptcy processes from 
being used as a form of tax avoidance (Wood 1995). In addition, it has been argued 
that the revenue is an involuntary creditor and therefore should be given preference 
over all other voluntary creditors (Day 2000). However, the revenue do have 
additional powers and authority other creditors do not have the benefit of, for 
example, the imposition of penalties and high interest rates, and the power to 
investigate and remove records (Revenue 2010). On the other hand, in the UK since 
1986, tax preference has been abolished entirely. This is to ensure the fair distribution 
of assets among the creditors equally (Cork Report 1982). The fair distribution of 
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assets among creditors is essential and the loss to the revenue if they are not a 
preferential creditor is disproportionate to the loss of a small business creditor, 
considering the financial difficulties SME’s are facing in this economic crisis. In 
addition to this, the revenue will receive extra corporation tax from the creditors who 
receive more as a result of the revenue not having a preferential status.  
 
High Costs 
Irish bankruptcy procedures are expensive considering the numerous court 
appearances that are necessary (LRC 2009). It is likely to cost tens of thousands of 
Euros (Hauser 2010), the Official Assignee alone can cost €6350 and over. 
Furthermore, if a creditor has petitioned to have the debtor declared bankrupt, they 
must provide an indemnity to cover the fees of the Official Assignee, often at great 
expense (Holohan and Sanfey 2010).  It has been found by Lee et al (2010) that the 
cost of bankruptcy in Ireland is approximately 9% of the estate. The costs associated 
with bankruptcy include; payment of the High Court petition proceedings, the fees of 
the Official Assignee including any stamp duty on realised assets and the payment of 
preferential creditors (Holohan 2010).   The LRC (2010) propose the reduction of 
costs and to make the bankruptcy system more accessible to debtors although they do 
not specify how this could be achieved. The current limit for other civil matters in the 
High Court is €38092.14 and over. In the LRC (2010a) paper on Court Reform, they 
recommend this limit be increased to €100,000. Therefore, cases involving large 
amounts of debt will still need to be held in the High Court. This does not follow the 
recommendations of the second chance report (2007) and INSOL (2001) which state 
that all individuals should have access to bankruptcy and therefore cost should not be 
a prohibitive factor.  
 
The costs of bankruptcy could also affect the credit flow in society. White and Fan 
(2003) found that if the cost of bankruptcy is high, entrepreneurs borrow less and 
avoid bankruptcy even when in financial difficulties. Furthermore, Lee et al. (2007), 
Peng et al. (2010), Cumming and Armour (2008) and Halliday and Carruthers (2007) 
find that lowering the cost of bankruptcy lowers the entry barriers to becoming self 
employed and makes it a more attractive option. Entrepreneurship is a very important 
element in Ireland’s road to recovery and reducing the costs of bankruptcy might 
 20
indeed encourage more self employment. High bankruptcy costs “can cause sluggish 
economic growth” (Mason 2005: 1523). In other words, high bankruptcy costs may 
provide over indebted individuals with an incentive to delay filing for bankruptcy 
which can reduce the amount which could be distributed among creditors.  
 
2.6 Effect on Credit Flow 
The relationship between credit and bankruptcy legislation has not been considered by 
the LRC (2010) in their final recommendations paper. This is an important factor 
considering the current economic climate. Ihle (2011) reports that, for the first quarter 
of 2011, 48% of small businesses who applied for credit were refused. Many 
academics have found a direct relationship between the flow of credit and bankruptcy 
laws including Broadie et al. (2007) and Choi and Phan (2006). Funchal (2007), Lee 
et al., (2007), Bebchuk (2002), and Kahl (2002) studied the impact of an increase in 
debtors protection when such levels are low and found that by increasing the level of 
debtor protection in bankruptcy, firms cost of debt increased and that there is a 
decrease in the flow of credit. Berkowitz and White (2004) find that the rejection rate 
for credit in the US in states where bankruptcy laws are more debtor friendly is 30%. 
Djankov et al (2008), using a larger sample of countries, concluded that more creditor 
protection is associated with broader credit market. It is important that the balance is 
right, bankruptcy law needs to encourage entrepreneurship through more debtor 
friendly laws and yet, it also needs to encourage a steady credit flow as directors and 
sole traders need access to credit in order to operate and trade. 
 
2.7 Abuse of the system 
Some American economists have argued that too many people took unfair advantage 
of the bankruptcy system because of their lenient laws (Adkisson and McFerrin 2005, 
White 1991). Weller et al (2010) stated that bankruptcy in the US no longer carried an 
adverse stigma and that many filings were "bankruptcies of convenience." (Weller et 
al 2010:1) In 2005 the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) was implemented. Abuse of the current Irish bankruptcy system would 
not seem to be a factor due to the severe penalties imposed and low levels of 
individuals using this system. The LRC (2010) propose a more lenient system towards 
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debtors and is expecting the number of bankrupts to increase to 3,680 per annum. Fay 
et al (2003) found that as the number of bankruptcies increase, the level of stigma 
associated with it decreases as the public become more familiar with the process. 
Although this stigma needs to be reduced here in Ireland, it is important that 
bankruptcy still carries some stigma in order to prevent abuse. According to White 
(1991) if bankruptcy laws are too lenient, then many individuals will take on too 
much debt only to be relieved of it at the expense of society. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
It has been established that there is a need for a reform of the BA 1988. The literature 
review highlighted the many negative aspects of the current legislation placing 
emphasis on research outcomes produced by agencies such as the LRC (2010). The 
LRC (2010) outlined many issues with the current legislation which discourages 
entrepreneurship. These include the discharge period, the amount of preferential 
debts, not distinguishing between culpable and non-culpable bankrupts and the high 
costs. They have recommended these issues be dealt with by introducing an automatic 
discharge period, abolishing preferential debts, differentiating between culpable and 
non-culpable bankrupts and finally reducing the costs associated with the process.    
 
The need for a balanced approach to bankruptcy legislation was also considered. It is 
important that bankruptcy legislation on the one hand encourages entrepreneurship, 
while on the other hand discourages abuse and does not affect the flow of credit. This 
is an essential balance which is important to strike considering the effect these issues 
could have on economic growth. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will outline the methodology that was applied in order to find; why there 
is a need to reform the BA 1988, are the proposals put forward by the LRC 
appropriate and are there any issues with the introduction of more debtor friendly 
legislation. Firstly, the chosen data collection method, semi structured interviews, will 
be explained and justified in order to clearly demonstrate why this method was 
chosen. This is followed by an explanation regarding the interview questions asked 
and a profile of the interviewees. Finally, a brief description of the data analysis 
method adapted will be given and also a description of the limitations associated with 
this type of methodology.    
 
3.2 Data Collection Method Adopted 
In order to gather primary data for this thesis, semi structured in depth interviews 
were chosen as the data collection method. This method was chosen because it allows 
for an interpretive philosophy to be adopted. This philosophy allows for a flexible 
approach to be taken when collecting the data (Saunders et al. 2009) and is best suited 
to this type of thesis as it takes into account the changing business environment. This 
is particularly important as the information regarding the reform of the BA 1988 is 
constantly changing and new developments can be expected at any stage. 
Additionally, considering the issues to be dealt with are complex in nature, this 
philosophy facilities the understanding of how and why. It allows for the details of the 
situation to be understood and the reality working behind them (Remenyi et al. 2003). 
By adopting this approach to the data collection, rich insights can be gained into the 
issues with the current legislation and whether the proposals of the Law Reform 
Commission are appropriate to deal with these issues.  
 
Semi structured interviews are a valuable means of conducting exploratory research. 
This type of research is suitable where flexibility and adaptability is a must. It will 
allow for the changing of direction if new data appears which reveals new insights 
(Saunders et al 2009). Furthermore, as the research surrounds the opinions and 
perceptions of insolvency practitioners regarding the reform of this legislation, the 
 23
data to be collected is subjective and qualitative. Using semi structured interviews 
means that the questions can be open-ended and the flow in which they are asked can 
be flexible so that questions could be added or omitted as necessary (Hair et al. 2007). 
This will help to ensure all the necessary information is gathered. As each individual 
has their own unique opinion this also needed to be catered for in the data collection 
method chosen. The flexibility of this type of interview allowed the interviewees to 
fully express their own opinions on the current legislation and the reform, and explain 
why they felt this way.     
 
3.3 Interview Themes 
From the outset it was taken into account that these are high profile busy professionals 
so it was essential that the questions were kept to a minimum to ensure only 30 
minutes of their time was taken up.  It was important not to ask the interviewees to 
name or give any specifics regarding any cases which they described as this would 
have had an adverse effect on the interview process. Specifics about cases were not 
necessary for this thesis and so it was ensured that such questions were avoided.  
 
The interviewees were asked to give their opinions on the current and proposed 
legislation in order to answer the research questions.  To ensure all issues addressed in 
the literature review were covered in the interview, the interviewees were all asked to 
comment on the same issues. Additionally they were offered the chance to add any 
other issues they felt had been missed but were important. The discouragement of 
entrepreneurship was the overarching theme as this is the main reason for the reform 
of the bankruptcy legislation. By asking interviewees whether or not the current 
legislation discouraged entrepreneurship shows whether this is a valid reason for a 
reform of this legislation. 
 
The next issue addressed was the discharge period. This is the most controversial 
issue with the current legislation and so it was important to understand what was the 
insolvency practitioners opinion on this. Also, it sought to find whether they felt that 
the proposed three year automatic discharge period was more appropriate in the 
current times.    
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In order to find out what are the current issues with having preferential classes of 
creditors and having the payment of these as a condition of discharge the interviewees 
were asked to express their views. This aimed to highlight what would be the 
consequence of removing preferential debts as proposed by the LRC, and also 
whether this was likely in the current economic climate.  
 
If the proposals of the LRC are implemented, culpable and non-culpable bankrupts 
will be distinguished between. Interviewees were asked to give their opinions on this 
in order to find if these proposals are practical and realistic and if not what would 
more suitable alternatives be.  
 
Another major criticism of the bankruptcy process is that it is expensive. There is not 
much published data on the costs associated with bankruptcy and so the insolvency 
practitioners were asked to give an average figure.  As a solution to this issue, the 
LRC have proposed the introduction of a non-judicial system. It was also suggested to 
the interviewees that the process could be removed from the High Court as this might 
reduce costs. It was also suggested to the interviewees that in order to reduce the 
costs, the proceedings should be taken out of the High Court and a non-judicial 
process set up. Interviewees were asked to express their opinions on these alternatives 
in order to see if these would be suitable and appropriate. 
 
Much literature exists in America that suggests if bankruptcy laws are relaxed they 
will be abused and as a result the flow of credit will reduce as creditors are less likely 
to receive as much in a bankruptcy situation. As the credit flow in Ireland is already 
an issue, interviewees were asked did they feel this would become an issue here as it 
did in America.  
 
3.4 Profile of the interviewees 
In order to enhance the quality of the findings and discussion section, each 
interviewee was asked for their permission to attribute their names to their individual 
opinions. The interviewees were chosen because of their high profile presence in the 
area of bankruptcy and so it was felt that it would not be appropriate to anonymise 
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their contributions to this thesis. All interviewees gave their permission except for 
one. This individual will be referred to as Anon.      
   
Interviews were conducted with the following insolvency practitioners: 
Bill Holohan of Holohan Solicitors has worked with bankruptcy for 25 years and he is 
regarded as the main authority on this subject in Ireland. He has recently published 
the second edition of his book, Bankruptcy Law and Practice in Ireland. He is a 
member of the Irish Society of Insolvency Practitioners ISIP and regularly presents 
with the Law Reform Commission in regards to reform. 
 
Declan Black of Mason, Hayes and Curran works with complex insolvency matters 
resolving disputes between the parties in question. He is also a course tutor in 
insolvency for the Law Society of Ireland.  
 
Barry O’Neill of Eugene F Collins is a consultant on insolvency matters for the Law 
Society's Education Programme and a contributing author to Insolvency Law 
published by the Law Society of Ireland. He is one of the compilers of the Combined 
Companies Acts 1963-1990. Mr. O’Neill is Chairman of the Law Reform Committee 
of the Irish Society of Insolvency Practitioners (ISIP).   
 
Sean Kelly of Farrell, Grant and Sparks is the director of insolvency at this firm and 
has written many articles on bankruptcy for the Sunday Business Post.  He also has 
many years’ experience working with insolvency and bankruptcy in the UK.    
 
Michael Leydon of Kavanagh Fennell has over 13years of insolvency experience. He 
regularly writes articles on bankruptcy for insolvencyjournal.ie. He is also a Member 
of the ISIP and the Law Reform Committee of the ISIP.  
 
Jim Stafford of Friel Stafford was interviewed over the phone. Mr Stafford is the 
founding member of this firm and deals specifically with business debt. He has 
lectured and written widely on insolvency matters. He is also a member of the ISIP.  
 
Madeline Murray was also interviewed over the phone. Ms. Murray is the senior 
manager at Deloitte in Cork. She deals with both corporate and personal insolvencies 
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and is a member of both the ISIP and also the UK’s Insolvency Practitioners 
Association.   
.  
3.5 Data Analysis 
In order to analysis the data collected, the interviews were firstly transcribed. They 
were then categorised according to the issues addressed in the question. This allowed 
for the rearrangement and analysis of the data systematically and rigorously (Blaxter 
et al. 2006).. Here, unnecessary data was removed to ensure that the data remaining 
was linked specifically to the research questions. This allowed the data to be 
presented in a more manageable and comprehensible form. The final step taken was to 
reorganise the information in order to recognise relationships and patterns. Examples 
of these relationships and patterns included how many interviewees agreed with the 
fact the BA 1988 discourages entrepreneurship. Additionally, did the reason given by 
the interviewees for their responses agree or disagree with the literature. This allowed 
for conclusions to be drawn and also for the identification of instances where it would 
not be possible to draw such conclusions, if there was more than one different 
suggestion put forward or where there was conflicting opinions.  
 
3.6 Limitations of the Research 
As with all research, there were limitations associated with this methodology. As all 
interviewees chosen were high profile professionals it was necessary due to their busy 
schedules, to conduct two of the interviews over the phone. This was a limitation 
considering face to face interviews have been found to produce more credible results 
as the personal contact allows for trust to be built. This trust can be difficult to 
achieve over the phone and may have resulted in the reluctance of the interviewees to 
divulge too much information (Saunders et al. 2009). Additionally, the time 
constraints of this research resulted in a limited time period within which interviews 
could be conducted. As a result, it was not possible to interview all concerned 
stakeholders.     
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3.7 Conclusion 
Semi structured interviews were the chosen data collection method as this research 
aims to discover the opinions and perceptions of insolvency practitioners. This 
research is interpretive and exploratory as the method used is flexible and takes into 
account the changing business environment which bankruptcy is a part of. Eight 
interviews were conducted with high profile insolvency practitioners. The findings of 
these will be presented in chapter four.    
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Chapter 4: Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the findings of the primary research. In order to establish why 
there is a need to reform this legislation all issues identified in the literature will be 
further explored. Furthermore, this chapter discloses the opinions and perceptions of 
insolvency practitioners as to whether the proposed legislation is appropriate and if 
not what they believe to be more appropriate alternatives. Finally, it will outline the 
opinions and perceptions of the interviewees with regards the introduction of lenient 
bankruptcy laws.    
 
4.2 Entrepreneurship 
The general consensus from the interviewees was that current bankruptcy legislation 
discourages entrepreneurship as it prevents bankrupts from re-entering the business 
community. However, all interviewees felt that entrepreneurs do not think of the 
possibility of bankruptcy from the outset and in the majority of cases do not even 
know the consequences of bankruptcy.  
 
O’Neill believes bankruptcy in Ireland is not a relief process as it should be, but a 
punishment, as it sometimes never allows the bankrupt back into the business 
community. Holohan uses the metaphor of a “lobster pot” to describe the Irish 
bankruptcy process; once you get into it, it is nearly impossible to get out of. In 
comparison to this, he uses the analogy of a “car wash” to describe the UK system. 
You go in and you come out clean after a year but without the car, this leaves you free 
to buy another car. Holohan also refers to the EC second chance report which states 
that bankrupts are more successful second time round having learnt from their 
mistakes. He also refers to the fact here in Ireland there is still a “Dickensian” 
approach to bankruptcy.  
 
There were many anti-entrepreneurial issues highlighted in the literature review, these 
include; the discharge period, the lack of a distinction between culpable and non-
culpable bankrupts, the payment of preferential debts before discharge and the high 
costs of proceedings. All interviewees were asked to comment on each of these issues 
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in order to establish what exactly the issues with the current legislation are and what 
are their opinions and perceptions regarding the reformed legislation and its 
appropriateness.     
Discharge period 
All interviewees agreed that the current conditional discharge period of twelve years 
is too long. Leydon calls it “ridiculous” while O’Neill describes it as “a punishment”. 
O’Neill further explained that the twelve year discharge period was an idea of the 
Budd Committee in the 1960’s so even in 1988 it was out dated. The idea was to 
ensure bankrupts were not allowed to re-enter the business community for as long as 
possible as it was believed bankruptcies were brought about by fraud or sharp 
practices. However this could be called into question as, Holohan explains that in 
twenty five years he has only dealt with five bankrupts who have had an element of 
fraud. Instead, he believes in general bankrupts tend to be “unlucky, stupid or both” 
and he is sure each one of them would have learned from their mistakes.  
 
When asked what a more suitable period would be, all interviewees agreed that the 
three year automatic discharge proposed by the LRC was appropriate. There was 
consensus among the interviewees that this period would allow the bankrupt back into 
the business community in a more appropriate length of time. Additionally, they felt 
that a shorter period would be unsuitable and they all made reference to the fact the 
UK’s one year discharge period is too short. Furthermore, Anon states that a three 
year period has been successful in Australia.   Kelly and O’Neill furthered the 
argument for a three year discharge by stating that this will be ample time for the 
estate to be realised whereas in the UK, the estate will likely not be fully realised 
before the bankrupt is discharged. A three year discharge would result in the creditors 
receiving their monies before the bankrupt is automatically discharged.  
 
The government of 2007 made a commitment at European level to introduce an 
automatic discharge period of three years but as of yet this has not materialised. 
However, there have been two provisions in relation to this in the Civil Miscellaneous 
Bills of 2010 and 2011, introducing an automatic discharge of twenty years and 
twelve years respectively. To date neither of these Bills has been brought into law. 
Many reasons for the reluctance of the government to honour the commitment that 
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was given in 2007 has been put forward by the interviewees. Holohan believes this is 
because the government do not want to be seen to be facilitating “the Galway tent 
brigade” by supporting debt forgiveness. This could be described as a form of 
clientelism. Black agrees, making reference to the fact that a short discharge period 
may be viewed as “politically unappealing” for the current government. Leydon 
explains debt forgiveness is inevitable because of the substantial debts that many 
individuals have amassed. Leydon believes the government do not want to admit this 
yet as they would be viewed by the public as effectively writing off the debts of the 
rich and famous, instead, they want to keep up the pretence that they will chase 
everyone for as long as they can. He adds that as a result, the reformed bankruptcy 
legislation is not expected to be published for at least ten or twelve months and that it 
may not be enacted for another four years. He also adds that this is effectively a waste 
of everyone’s time, money and effort and it would be much better if the government 
would fast track this reform and allow these individuals to get on with their lives.  
 
This introduces a political dimension to bankruptcy as it would appear that the 
government are more concerned about their image than introducing new effective 
bankruptcy legislation. This highlights the fact that perhaps the reason why this 
reform has not taken place to date is due to political motivations.  
 
Culpable and non-culpable 
The majority of interviewees agreed there should be a distinction made between 
culpable and non-culpable bankrupts. They agreed with the LRC’s proposal to restrict 
culpable bankrupts similar to the restriction imposed on directors under the 
companies’ acts.  Leydon and Black add to this by stating the discharge period should 
depend upon how the debt arose, whether it was fraudulently, recklessly or both. 
However, Leydon believes that a five year restriction period would be appropriate. 
Stafford and Black also add there should be penalties where the bankrupt does not co-
operate with the proceedings. Black suggests discharge should be dependent on co-
operation. However, Murray although agreeing, feels that it would be “impossible, 
timely and costly” to make a distinction. She explains it is difficult to prove an 
individual has acted fraudulently or recklessly. Recklessness has a very broad 
definition which can be interpreted in many different ways. Furthermore, she adds 
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that the number of successful cases brought against directors on either of these 
grounds is quite low. 
 
Kelly, O’Neill and Anon disagreed with the LRC’s proposals. They believe that all 
bankrupts should be treated the same under bankruptcy legislation, regardless. They 
explained criminal matters should be held in the criminal courts and civil matters in 
the civil courts as otherwise this would complicate the process further.  If fraud or 
recklessness is the reason for the bankruptcy, these matters should be dealt with 
separately, in the criminal courts. However, in response to this suggestion, Black 
refers to the lack of white collar prosecutions in this country and feels that this factor 
should be considered by the legislator.  
 
This highlights a lack of consensus among insolvency practitioners with regard to the 
LRC’s proposal.   
 
In relation to the payment of debts after discharge by culpable bankrupts, all 
interviewees felt this was not realistic and unlikely to be successful if implemented. 
Holohan makes reference to the fact there is currently a provision in the BA 1988 
which allows the Official Assignee to attach a repayment to the bankrupts earnings, 
however, in recent times he has not chosen to do so, as bankrupts in general do not 
earn much after they have been declared so. Additionally, Leydon stated that he 
believes bankrupts will be deterred from working if their wages are garnished by 
debts owed; especially considering how reasonable social welfare payments are. In 
addition to this, Kelly feels that as these are ‘culpable bankrupts’ they are more likely 
to avoid any repayment of debt where possible. 
 
This shows that it is possible of culpable bankrupts to avoid such repayments. It also 
highlights that if this is enacted it may not be used considering the Official Assignee 
has chosen not to use the current provision.   
Preferential debts  
All interviewees agreed that the condition which states preferential debts must be paid 
before discharge is the main constraint preventing bankrupts from being discharged. 
They stated this is the reason why many bankruptcies last beyond twelve years. 
 32
Holohan described a case where a client of his has now remained in bankruptcy for 
thirty years as a result of this condition. He approached Holohan recently and asked 
him was this constitutional. Holohan believes it is not however, to bring a 
constitutional case to court this would cost at least €50,000. Murray believes going 
forward this condition is not realistic considering the amount of revenue debts 
businesses are accumulating prior to bankruptcy. Anon adds that this is the reason 
why many travel to the UK in order to be declared bankrupt as there are no 
preferential debts recognised in their system. In order to address this issue, the LRC 
propose the removal of all preferential debts. As they have proposed an automatic 
discharge period of three years this would also ensure bankrupts would be discharged 
regardless of the preferential debts that is owed. The general consensus among the 
interviewees was that the removal of preferential debts would in theory be a fairer 
way of dividing out the estate however; in reality they do not think it will be 
implemented. Holohan, Kelly, O’Neill and Stafford felt that this is unlikely to happen 
as ultimately the final decision rests with the government. Considering the current 
economic climate they are unlikely to change the revenues preferential status.  
 
Stafford and Black believe that if preferential debts were removed, bankruptcy would 
be open to abuse as it could become very attractive as a form of tax avoidance. 
Leydon feels that this would mean more creditors would be involved in the process, in 
turn creating more work for the Official Assignee when dividing out the estate, 
therefore increasing the costs of the process. 
 
 Kelly points out that as a result of their preferential status the revenue “are slow” to 
chase their insolvent debtors as they can accumulate interest and penalties on these 
debts, in the knowledge these must all be paid before discharge.  
 
This also demonstrates the political dimension to bankruptcy as the government 
would again appear to be using their powers to ensure the revenue receives payment 
before other creditors. It also highlights the revenues inefficiencies regarding the 
collection of taxes as it would appear they are content with the fact that significant 
amounts of interest and penalties are accumulating on these unpaid taxes at the 
expense of the other creditors. 
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Costs of bankruptcy 
All interviewees agreed that the costs of bankruptcy are too high. Leydon stated that 
the cheapest Official Assignee costs he has experienced have been €10,000 while on 
average it is approximately €35,000. As a result of these high costs, Anon and 
Holohan state that the majority of bankrupts cannot afford representation and 
therefore have no option but to represent themselves in the High Court. 
 
Black believes that because the courts insist on an “incredible technical” process this 
drives up costs. This process is “technical” because the examiner’s office of the High 
Court supervises the Official Assignee. Holohan explains that this effectively means 
one court official is supervising another which makes for a slower, more expensive 
process with too much red tape. Holohan also explains this is because up until 1924 
the Official Assignee was essentially one of the creditors which they had nominated. 
This Official Assignee worked under the supervision of the courts and this provision 
was never removed from the 1988 act. Furthermore, where counsel is involved this 
makes the process more expensive. 
  
All interviewees agreed that in order to reduce these costs, bankruptcy procedures 
should be moved out of the High Court. Holohan makes reference to the fact that 
there used to be a bankruptcy court in Cork until the early 1960’s and so there is no 
reason why other courts could not hold such cases. He states that from time to time 
bankruptcy can involve complex legal issues but more often than not it would be more 
suitable to have cases heard in the Circuit Court as it would be less expensive overall. 
Murray feels that as the amount of cases are potentially going to be high; the lower 
courts will need to be involved in order to ensure an efficient process. Leydon agrees 
describing the current process as “inefficient” due to how busy the High court is and 
this will become a real issue if bankruptcies increase from 29 (2010) to the thousand 
or so expected (Holohan, Black and Leydon).  
 
Leydon suggests that in order to determine which court the bankruptcy is held in, the 
level of debt could be used as an indicator. He feels that if the level of debt is quite 
low then it can be assumed the case will be less complex and there is likely to be no 
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fraud or recklessness involved as these factor are generally associated with substantial 
debt. Black takes a different perspective, although he believes the High Court 
involvement is unnecessary, he also feels that the judges in the Circuit Court are not 
equipped and competent enough in commercial matters in order to deal with such 
cases.  In response to this, Holohan and O’Neill feel this may reflect the current 
situation but with some time to prepare they have no doubt these judges would be 
capable.  
 
In order to further reduce costs, Kelly feels the Official Assignee should have less 
involvement in the process. As the Official Assignee is a public servant, Kelly feels 
that this results in a “drawn out and quite tedious” process, adding to the costs. The 
Official Assignee is in charge of realising the assets and distributing this among the 
creditors. Kelly suggests that there should be a system similar to that in the UK where 
insolvency practitioners play more of a role. In relation to this, Leydon explains there 
is a growing concern about insolvency practitioners being more involved in the 
process as these are professionals who are concerned about their fees creating a 
conflict of interests (Leydon).  
 
To substantially reduce the costs, the LRC have proposed the introduction of a non-
judicial system. However, all interviewees agreed that cases involving business debt 
would be more suited to the legal system as these cases tend to be more complex. 
O’Neill believes that cases involving company directors need a sense of authority and 
seriousness and this can only be found in the High Court.  
 
This shows that the current legislation is too bureaucratic and includes unnecessary 
provisions making the process more expensive with no real added benefits. It also 
highlights the pressure that the High Court will come under if the numbers of 
bankruptcies increase and the need for the circuit court to be involved in this process. 
Furthermore, it shows that insolvency practitioners are eager to become more 
involved in the process.  
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4.3 Bankruptcy as an option 
All interviewees felt that bankruptcy is no longer viewed as an option by over 
indebted individuals or their creditors due to its punitive nature and also as the costs 
associated with it are too high.   
 
Leydon , Black and Holohan state that for a creditor to put their debtor into 
bankruptcy, they would need to apply to the court and the costs of this would be at 
least €7000.  Holohan feels this is disproportionate when compared to the statutory 
minimum of €1900 debt needed to start bankruptcy proceedings. This figure was also 
suggested by the Budd Committee in the 1960’s when the equivalent in Irish punt 
would have bought you a small house (Holohan). As a result, Kelly, Black, Holohan, 
O’Neill and Leydon agree that currently creditors are not forcing their debtors into 
bankruptcy, instead they are getting court judgement mortgages against them as this 
has proven to be a more effective method for the creditor to receive what they are 
owed. This effectively prohibits the debtor selling an asset without sharing the 
proceeds with the creditor. This is because it is too expensive for the creditor to force 
the individual into bankruptcy and they may not receive the debt they are owed if the 
debtor is a “can’t pay”.  
 
Black makes the point that in addition to reforming the BA 1988, a law should be 
introduced which enables the creditors to fully understand the amount of assets the 
debtor has. This would ensure the creditors could easily distinguish between the “cant 
pays” and the “wont pays”. In other words, that the creditor would know from the 
outset whether the debtor had the funds and was merely refusing to pay, this type of 
individual is referred to as a “won’t pay”, or if the debtor could not afford to pay, this 
type of individual is referred to as a “can’t pay”. He believes that the most effective 
way to achieve this would be to implement a system whereby after a successful 
judgement has been brought against the debtor, their financial institutions will be 
obliged to hand over to the creditors all their financial information. The current 
system of requesting the debtor to fill out a statement of net worth, allows for the 
hiding of assets. Black further explains the most effective way to establish how much 
money an individual has is to examine their bank statements. If the creditor was 
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satisfied that the debtor was a “cant pay” they would not force them into bankruptcy. 
Holohan and O’Neill also refer to this stating that there is no point putting an 
individual into bankruptcy if they have no assets to be realised. Leydon reiterates this 
point by stating that the creditors do not and will not force individuals into bankruptcy 
as it is an additional cost to them and if the debtor is a “can’t pay” it would be 
effectively a waste of time and money. This situation is unlikely to change after the 
reform, instead Leydon believes voluntary bankrupts will become the norm. 
 
This has shown that the statutory limit of €1900 is out-dated as it has not been 
changed for twenty three years. It has also been identified that there is a gap in the 
system which gives bankrupts the opportunity to conceal the true value of their estate. 
As a result of this, the system does not support creditors because of the costs and lack 
of information available to them from the outset. 
 
4.4 Lenient laws 
It has been suggested that the introduction of more lenient bankruptcy laws could 
have an adverse effect on credit flow and may also attract abuse by individuals trying 
to alleviate their debts. 
Effect on credit flow 
Stafford and Murray were the only interviewees that did believe credit flow would be 
affected if more lenient laws are implemented. Leydon and Black do not feel that it 
will make the situation any worse than it already is, as individuals are already finding 
it difficult to obtain credit in the current economic climate.  However, Leydon 
believes that creditors are likely to become more vigilant about the contracts signed 
regarding the issue of goods; more retention of titles is likely to be seen and also 
shorter credit limits. Holohan believes that this is an issue in the US because of the 
high rate of bankruptcies, 0.5% of total population. The reason for high levels of 
bankruptcies in the US stems from their culture as they view the process as a 
“learning curve”. Ireland’s culture regarding bankruptcy differs greatly as there is 
much stigma attached to this topic. O’Neill and Kelly state Ireland is a conservative 
country and for this reason credit flow will not become an issue. After the reform, 
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Holohan, Black and Leydon expect the bankruptcy figures will reach the thousands 
while Kelly and O’Neill believe it may only reach 1000.  
 
If Ireland’s percentage of bankrupts increased to a level similar to that of 0.5% in the 
US, this would equate to 23,350 Irish bankrupts, however this is unlikely considering 
the general consensus among the interviewees that the figures expected is 
significantly lower than this. It has been identified that stricter terms and conditions 
will become the norm among creditors. 
Abuse of the system 
Interviewees were divided as to whether more lenient legislation would encourage 
abuse of the system. O’Neill, Stafford, Holohan and Murray do not believe that the 
laws will be relaxed enough for the system to be abused. They also believe 
individuals will be deterred from abusing the system as discharged bankrupts have 
great difficulty obtaining loans, mortgages and any type of credit. On the other hand, 
Kelly, Anon, Black and Leydon believe wherever a law is relaxed it is to be 
anticipated that a limited number of individuals will try to abuse the system. Anon 
adds that the benefits of introducing lenient bankruptcy legislation will bring benefits 
which will far outweigh this minor drawback.  This identifies that all interviewees 
agreed that this will not become a serious issue after reform.    
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the opinions and perceptions of the interviewees 
regarding the issues with the current legislation. Although, there is a general 
consensus among the interviewees that a reform is necessary, there are some 
conflicting opinions on the provisions that the new Bill should include. Finally, it 
showed that there are not expected to be any issues with the introduction of more 
lenient legislation.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will link the findings from both the primary and secondary research in 
order to discuss the overall outcomes and to form a perspective on the research 
findings. 
 
5.2 Entrepreneurship 
The literature found that at a time when Ireland needs entrepreneurs in business to 
help grow the economy, the current bankruptcy legislation discourages this by firstly, 
deterring individuals from entering business and secondly, by preventing bankrupts 
from re-entering the business community (LRC 2009, Daly 2010, ISME Fielding 
2011 and Holohan 2011).  
 
The primary and secondary research finds that bankruptcy legislation acts as a 
“complete bar” (Holohan) by locking individuals in and preventing them from re-
entering the business community (LRC 2010). Holohan describes the system as a 
“lobster pot”. Irish legislation effectively gives entrepreneurs one opportunity and 
does not give them the chance to learn from their mistakes. However, it has been 
found that bankrupts are more successful second time round (OECD 2003, Second 
Chance Report 2011, Kok 2004, Ekanem and Wyer 2007, Dybvad 2011, Schror 2006 
and Stam et al. 2006).  
 
However the interviewees disagreed with the literature put forward by Peng et al. 
(2009), White (2010) and Gallop (2009) as they believe entrepreneurs do not think 
about the possibility of bankruptcy from the outset and in the majority of cases do not 
even know the consequences of bankruptcy. Perhaps a reason for the difference in 
opinion is that the interviewees only interact with those who took the risk and became 
entrepreneurs. The research outlined in the literature included a more diverse 
population as they included both self-employed individuals and also those who 
choose not to go into business. 
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Both the literature and the primary research found that the current bankruptcy 
legislation is anti-entrepreneurial for the following reasons; the discharge period, the 
lack of a distinction between culpable and non-culpable bankrupts, the payment of 
preferential debts before discharge and the high costs associated with the process.   
Discharge 
The discharge period was the most significant issue identified with the current 
legislation in both the primary and secondary research. The twelve year period was 
based on an assumption made by the Budd Committee in the 1960’s that all 
bankruptcies were as a result of sharp practices or fraud. Even if this was the case 
fifty years ago, this has no presentence in to-days business environment. Additionally, 
evidence drawn from the second chance report (2007) states that only 3-6% of 
bankruptcies across in the EU have some element of fraud. This position is further 
argued by Holohan as he states that in twenty five years he has only experienced five 
bankruptcy cases with an element of fraud.  
 
There is a general consensus among the interviewees and the authors reviewed that an 
automatic discharge period needs to be introduced. It was agreed by all interviewees 
that the period of three years proposed by the LRC would be appropriate. This would 
allow honest bankrupts back into business in a more suitable length of time.  
 
According to the primary and secondary research a three year automatic discharge 
period is a very important contributing factor to making this legislation more 
entrepreneurial. This begs the question as to why it has not been implemented already.  
Holohan, Black and Leydon suggest that perhaps the government do not want to be 
seen supporting debt forgiveness which may favor the “Galway tent brigade”. The 
primary research found that the delay in the reform of bankruptcy legislation may be 
politically motivated and as a result, further damaging the economy. This can be seen 
as the government have failed to live up to the promise that was made four years ago. 
Additionally, this is evident considering the fact that each of the civil miscellaneous 
bills did not include an automatic discharge period of three years but instead twelve 
years.  
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Culpable and non-culpable 
The secondary research established that the LRC proposed a distinction should be 
made between culpable and non-culpable bankrupts. This is to ensure that culpable 
bankrupts are punished accordingly while also ensuring that honest bankrupts are 
released back into the business community. 
 
Five of the interviewees agreed with the secondary research to restrict these 
individuals similar to the restrictions imposed on directors in the companies’ acts. 
This view is supported also by the second chance report (2011) as it states that 
business failure is a normal part of economic life and non-culpable bankrupts should 
not be punished for this. 
 
The remaining interviewees disagree with the secondary research as they suggest no 
distinction should be made under bankruptcy legislation. They feel that the LRC’s 
proposal of an automatic three year discharge should apply to all bankrupts, whether 
they are culpable or non-culpable. Additionally they feel that if the bankruptcy is as a 
result of criminal dealings then this should be dealt with in the criminal courts. 
However, the effectiveness of this could be called into question as Webb, McBride 
(2011) and Black refers to the fact there are very few “white collar” prosecutions in 
this country.   Furthermore, the literature suggests that the current legislation may be 
unconstitutional as it is soon to be challenged by a team of lawyers (Kennedy 2011).  
 
In relation to garnishing culpable bankrupt’s income after discharge, all interviewees 
felt this is unrealistic. Holohan made reference to the fact that this provision exists in 
the current legislation and is unused. Leydon and Kelly agree with the literature as 
they feel that this condition will deter these individuals from working (White 2010).  
 
It is important that which ever route is taken on this issue, the outcome results in the 
protection of the business community from culpable bankrupts while also encouraging 
its success by allowing honest bankrupts to re-enter sooner in order to contribute to 
the economy.  
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Preferential debt  
All interviewees and authors reviewed agreed that the condition which states 
preferential debts must be paid before discharge is the main reason preventing 
bankrupts from being discharged under the current legislation. The LRC have 
proposed to remove this stipulation as this condition is almost never met. However, 
the government has included a conditional discharge in both Civil Miscellaneous 
Bills. The latter Bill included a conditional discharge period of five years which is 
unlikely to be met considering the LRC (2010) state that the current twelve year 
conditional discharge is rarely fulfilled.    
 
The general consensus among the interviewees was that the removal of preferential 
classes of creditors, especially the revenue, is unlikely. Arguments for and against the 
removal of the revenues preference were put forward in both the literature and by the 
interviewees. On the one hand, if the revenues preference was dropped this may leave 
bankruptcy open to abuse by individuals trying to avoid the payment of tax (Wood 
1995, Black and Stafford). However, Kelly, Anon, Black and Leydon explain that 
some abuse is inevitable wherever a law is relaxed and this should not be a deterrent 
to creating a more supportive business environment.  
 
On the other hand, the secondary research suggested that if this condition remains it is 
unfair towards other creditors as they may be forced to write off potential large debts 
as there is likely to be little or no money remaining after revenue has been paid. This 
is not an ideal situation, especially in the current climate.  
 
The government is using their powers to ensure the revenue remains a preferential 
creditor while other creditors will suffer the consequences being forced to write off 
potentially significant amounts of debt. The effect that this would have on a small 
creditor is disproportionate compared to the effect it would have on the revenue. 
Additionally, if the revenue were to lose their preference this may be an incentive for 
them to collect taxes on a timelier basis.  
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Costs 
The primary and secondary research agreed that the costs of the bankruptcy process 
are too high. However, the secondary research findings did not offer any suggestions 
as to how these costs could be reduced for those with business debts. The LRC did 
propose a non-judicial system but all interviewees agreed that this system is geared at 
those with consumer debts and therefore irrelevant to this research.   There was 
consensus among the interviewees that bankruptcy proceedings should be held in the 
Circuit Court with appeals being referred to the High Court where necessary in order 
to reduce the costs. Holohan and O’Neill suggested however that training of the 
Circuit Court judges would be essential to ensure this process is effective. 
Additionally, it was suggested by Kelly that the Official Assignee’s involvement in 
the process should be reduced as this is also another contributing factor to the costs of 
the process. However, there is an element of bias as all interviewees are insolvency 
practitioners and these are the professionals who would benefit the most from a 
reduction in the involvement of the Official Assignee. However, this may be a valid 
argument as if the numbers of bankrupts reach the thousands as expected, it could be 
questionable whether one individual, the Official Assignee, would be able to continue 
realising all assets for distribution among creditors due to time and resource 
constraints. 
 
5.3 Bankruptcy as an option 
The secondary research describes how unused and ineffective the current bankruptcy 
legislation is. Djankov et al. (2008) states the main test of how effective bankruptcy 
legislation is at achieving its objectives is to look the amount of individuals who use 
the system. Considering only 29 individuals were declared bankrupt in in 2010 
(Collins 2011), this demonstrates the ineffectiveness of this legislation. 
  
The literature found that debtors rarely enter bankruptcy voluntarily as it is too 
punitive and difficult to get out off. Holohan and Sanfey (2010) found that in 2009 
there were only 2 voluntary bankruptcies out of a total 17. 
 
The primary and secondary research also found that creditors are obtaining court 
judgements against their debtors rather than force them into bankruptcy. The literature 
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found that there were 7,447 judgements in 2010 (Mulligan 2010) while the primary 
research revealed that the majority of these cases were judgement mortgages. The 
primary research found that the reason for this is due to the high costs associated with 
forcing a debtor into bankruptcy. Additionally, the primary research suggested that 
another reason why creditors are reluctant to force their debtors into bankruptcy is 
because they would be unaware from the outset whether the debtor was a “can’t pay” 
or a “won’t pay”. Black suggests that legislation should be put in place in order to 
ensure creditors are fully informed of their debtor’s financial position from the outset 
by granting them permission to view their debtor’s bank records rather than the 
current system of requiring the debtor to fill out a statement of net worth. Holohan 
states that there is no point chasing a debtor who has no money. Bankruptcy is 
effectively an assets liquidation process, if there are no assets it is more punitive on 
creditors as they would have the added expense of forcing the debtor into bankruptcy.  
 
Under the current system it has been suggested that debtors are capable of hiding 
assets from their creditors. This has been over looked by the LRC and to date there 
has been no mention of introducing such legislation. This demonstrates the current 
systems lack of support for creditors and this may remain an issue after the reform. 
Leydon supports this view by stating that after reform it is can be expected that 
voluntary bankruptcies will increase however, it is likely creditors will still not be 
forcing their debtors into banrkruptcy.   
5.4 Lenient laws 
The literature did suggest some issues may arise if the bankruptcy legislation is 
relaxed as proposed. These include an adverse effect on credit flow, as creditors can 
expect to receive less in a bankruptcy situation and also that the system may be open 
to abuse.   
Credit Flow 
The literature review revealed a direct relationship between credit flow and 
bankruptcy legislation in the US (Broadie et al. 2007, Choi and Phan 2006, Funchal 
2007, Lee et al., 2007, Bebchuk 2002, and Kahl 2002). This could become an issue 
with the introduction of more lenient legislation as these will increase the numbers of 
bankrupts. However, the majority of interviewees disagree with the literature as they 
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do not think relaxing the bankruptcy legislation would affect credit flow as it is not 
expected that the bankruptcy figures will increase to a level where this would become 
an issue. All literature on this topic is American where bankruptcy levels in 2010 
were 0.5% of the total population. If the bankruptcy figures increase in Ireland as 
expected to a maximum of 3000, this merely translates into 0.06% of total population.  
Instead, the general consensus was that there will be shorter credit limits and stricter 
contracts which stipulate retention of title.  
Abuse 
Adkisson and McFerrin (2005) and White (1991) found that making bankruptcy laws 
more lenient leaves the system open to abuse. The primary research found that half of 
the interviewees do not believe this will become an issue as they feel the law will not 
be relaxed enough for the system to attract abuse. However, the remaining 
interviewees believe that wherever a law is relaxed it is likely to attract abuse. Some 
abuse may be expected however according to Anon, the benefits of introducing a 
more lenient bankruptcy system far outweigh this drawback. Additionally, it is vital 
that the legislation is designed with this issue in mind in order to ensure individuals 
are deterred from taking advantage of this process to alleviate their debts 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter linked the primary and secondary research in order to discuss the 
findings. It has been found that there is a general consensus among the interviewees 
and the literature reviewed that a three year automatic discharge period is most 
appropriate. There was a difference in opinion in relation to the removal of 
preferential debts however; there was a general consensus that the government may be 
reluctant to remove the revenues preference.    Additionally, there was mixed 
responses in relation to the punishment which should apply to culpable bankrupts. 
Five of the interviewees agreed with the LRC’s proposal to restrict these individuals 
under bankruptcy legislation however, the remaining interviewees disagreed with this 
as they felt no distinction should be made between bankrupts under bankruptcy 
legislation. All interviewees disagreed with the LRC’s proposal to force culpable 
bankrupts to pay towards their debts after discharge as they felt this was unrealistic.  
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In relation to the costs associated with the process, both the primary and secondary 
research found that these are too high. In order to reduce these costs it was suggested 
that the bankruptcy process should be held in the Circuit Court. Finally, the majority 
of interviewees disagreed with the literature which stated lenient bankruptcy laws 
may have an adverse effect on credit flow as they do not believe bankruptcies will 
increase to a level where this would become a problem. There were different opinions 
offered regarding whether the system would be open to abuse as it is difficult to 
predict what the likely outcome of this would be. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Overall Conclusion 
Bankruptcy is supposed to be a relief process for both the creditors and the bankrupt 
however; the findings of both the primary and secondary research contradict this. 
Many issues with the current legislation have been identified however the most 
significant issue is the discouragement of entrepreneurship. The BA 1988 has been 
found to discourage entrepreneurship as it effectively locks individuals into 
bankruptcy, sometimes for the remainder of their lives. The reason for this is because 
the BA 1988 does not have an automatic discharge period; instead the twelve year 
discharge is merely conditional. The most severe condition which must be met in 
order to be discharged is the payment of preferential debts.  As these stipulations 
apply to both culpable and non-culpable bankrupts, the business community is starved 
of honest bankrupts who have learnt from their mistakes and are generally more 
successful second time round.  
 
As the costs of this process are so high this has effectively acted as a deterrent 
towards creditors forcing their debtors into bankruptcy. Additionally, the severe 
punishments have deterred debtors from applying for a voluntary bankruptcy.  As a 
result, this process has remained largely unused in recent times.  
 
In relation to the suitability of the LRC’s proposals, the majority of interviewees 
believed these would be appropriate however some conflicting opinions were 
identified. The primary and secondary research found that the LRC’s proposal of a 
three year automatic discharge period would be suitable as it would allow the 
bankrupt to re-enter the business community after a more appropriate length of time.  
However, there were some conflicting opinions in relation to the LRC’s proposal to 
punish culpable bankrupts.  
 
All interviewees felt that the LRC’s proposal to force culpable bankrupts to pay 
towards their debts after discharge was unrealistic and unlikely to be used if 
introduced. Instead, the majority of interviewees believed that culpable bankrupts 
should be restricted from re-entering the business community with disqualifications 
where necessary.  
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The majority of interviewees agreed with the LRC’s proposal to abolish all 
preferential debts as they felt this would ensure a fairer distribution of the estate 
however; all interviewees agreed that this is unlikely to be introduced as the 
government will not wish to remove the revenue preference. In order to reduce the 
costs associated with the process the LRC’s proposal of a non-judicial system was 
found to be unsuitable for those with business debts, instead the general consensus 
among the interviewees was that this process should be held in the Circuit Court with 
appeals to the High Court.  
 
Finally, the interviewees disagreed with the literature as they felt that there would be 
no adverse effect on credit flow with the introduction of more lenient bankruptcy 
legislation, instead they felt that stricter contracts and shorter credit limits will 
become more common. The interviewees were divided on whether they felt the 
system would be abused as it is difficult to predict what the outcome will be. 
 
6.2 Recommendations of further study 
Many areas of further study have been identified, including; the issue of white collar 
prosecutions in this country. An investigation into this area may shed some light on 
why the prosecution levels are so low, especially in comparison to other countries 
such as the US. This research could also help identify whether culpable and non-
culpable bankrupts should be distinguished between under bankruptcy legislation or 
whether this punishment should be left solely to the Director of Public Prosecutions.   
 
After the new legislation has been enacted research could be conducted in order to 
find if the issues identified with the current legislation have been resolved and if the 
new legislation has created the desired supportive entrepreneurial environment. 
Additionally, after the new legislation has been enacted an investigation into whether 
credit flow was adversely effected or whether the system is being abused would shed 
more light on this area as currently it is difficult to predict the expected outcome.  
 
A political dimension to bankruptcy legislation was introduced in the thesis in relation 
to shortening the discharge period and also the removal of the revenues preferential 
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debt status. This issue needs further research in order to conclude that there is in fact a 
political dimension and what effect this is having on creditors and the bankrupt.  
 
This thesis also introduced the possible need for a system where creditors would be 
aware from the outset about the financial position of their creditors. More research is 
needed in order to find what benefits could be reaped from such a system. 
   
In the UK insolvency practitioners play a more important role in the bankruptcy 
process as they are in charge of realising the assets and distributing the estate. Here in 
Ireland this role is undertaken by the Official Assignee. Research should be conducted 
in order to establish which system is more effective and efficient.  
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